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INTRODUCTION
The campaign for the Republican nomination for the American
presidency in 2015 and 2016 has been marked by hyperbole and fearmongering.1 No candidate has made such a pronounced impact in the
Copyright 2016, by ARTHUR L. RIZER, III.
* Arthur Rizer is the director of criminal justice police at the R Street
Institute, a Washington D.C. based think tank, a former Visiting Professor of Law
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category of shocking or politically incorrect verbiage as Donald Trump.2
One of the predominant talking points across Republican candidates’
campaigns has been illegal immigration and border security.3 Trump’s
framing of the issue put it into terms that have long been used to justify a
restricted immigration policy:4
Either we have a border or we don’t have a country. You can’t
have a country without borders. People are coming in and some of
those people—I read it even yesterday, there was a huge article
at Georgetown University Law Center, and an Associate Professor of Law at West
Virginia University School of Law. Rizer is a former criminal prosecutor with the
U.S. Department of Justice, and he also worked in the Civil Division on national
security and immigration cases. The author would like to thank Melanie Stimeling
for her review and comments and students J. Berkeley Bentley, Esha Sharma, and
Ben Wilson for their help in ensuring the quality and accuracy of this Article. The
author would also like to thank Garrett Filetti and Mackenzie Schott and their staff
of editors: Megan Rials, Katilyn Hollowell, Dustin Cooper, Leah Cook, and Julien
Petit for their dedication to ensuring this Article reached the quality it has.
1. See, e.g., Rex W. Huppke, GOP Candidates Want You to be Terrified, CHI.
TRIB. (May 20, 2015, 9:51 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion
/huppke/ct-huppke-gop-fear-mongering-20150520-story.html [https://perma.cc/VF
25-LND9] (analyzing quotes from Republican presidential contenders, concluding
that “[t]here’s something Republican presidential contenders want you to know:
You should be TERRIFIED”).
2. See, e.g., Karen Tumulty & Jenna Johnson, Why Trump May be Winning
the War on “Political Correctness,” W ASH. P OST: P OLITICS (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/why-trump-may-be-winning-the-war-on
-political-correctness/2016/01/04/098cf832-afda-11e5-b711-1998289ffcea_story
.html [https://perma.cc/UV97-EGLG].
3. See, e.g., Ed Kilgore, When Did the GOP Get So Extreme on Immigration?,
N.Y. MAG.: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 18, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://nymag
.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/12/when-did-the-gop-get-so-crazy-on-immigration
.html [https://perma.cc/U2DV-BPL4].
4. See Graham C. Ousey & Charis E. Kubrin, Exploring the Connection
Between Immigration and Violent Crime Rates in U.S. Cities, 1980-2000, 56
SOC. PROBS. 447, 447 (2009).
Nearly 80 years ago, criminologist Edwin Sutherland . . . highlighted
immigration and crime as an area of popular misconception and policy
distortion. Today, not much has changed as both public opinion about
immigration and immigration policy appear to be driven more by
stereotype than by empirical fact . . . . The misperception that the foreign
born, especially illegal immigrants, are responsible for higher crime rates
is deeply rooted in American public opinion and is sustained by media
anecdote and popular myth.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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about the tremendous crime that’s taking place. It’s like a crime
wave. One of the most dangerous places on earth.5
Although many commentators dismissed Trump as “a flawed candidate
who may be too inconsistent and nasty to appeal to most Americans,”6 his
consistently high polling “illustrate[s] deep anxiety and anger in the
country.”7 Statements such as this one evoke a sense of patriotism and stir
up “fears about the boom of immigrants without legal status,”8 while
echoing a fear of immigration that, whether intentional or not, drives
America’s immigration policy. Although Trump’s comments are harsh and
controversial, the base sentiment behind them—fear—is perfectly
understandable. Fear is instinctual; fear keeps us alive; fear motivates us
to question things around us and instigate change.
The United States’s response to the events of September 11, 2001 was
rooted in that survivalist instinct driven by fear. Because of the particular
impetus for the U.S. response, shortly after September 11, 2001, the field
of immigration law quickly became a focal point in the Global War on
Terror.9 Not only did the federal government enact new immigration laws
5. Pam Key, Trump on Mexico Comments: ‘I Can’t Apologize for the Truth,’
BREITBART (July 5, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/video/2015/07/05/trump-onmexico-comments-i-cant-apologize-for-the-truth/ [https://perma.cc/CKH7-U7KT].
6. Kenneth T. Walsh, Anxiety and Anger in America, U.S. NEWS: THE REP.
(Sept. 11, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015
/09/11/trumps-rise-illustrates-anger-and-anxiety-in-america [https://perma.cc/EWP
2-ZK29].
7. Id.; see also Tumulty & Johnson, supra note 2 (“The Republican frontrunner is saying what a lot of Americans are thinking but are afraid to say because
they don’t think that it’s politically correct . . . .”).
8. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, A Losing Trump Card, U.S. NEWS: THE REP.
(Sept. 18, 2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015
/09/18/donald-trumps-immigration-polices-are-a-loser-for-the-gop [https://perma
.cc/GR66-C9G2].
9. See Farrah G. de Leon, Note, Girding the Nation’s Armor: The
Appropriate Use of Immigration Law to Combat Terrorism, 3 REGENT J. INT’L L.
115, 115–16 (2005).
Three years after the tragic September 11, 2001, attacks, it is tempting to
believe that America has returned to a time of normalcy. Yet, few would
dispute that the nation is engaged in an ongoing War on Terror.
September 11 has forever changed America, triggering a war that is
affecting the everyday lives of Americans. This nation now realizes that,
despite its strength, it is vulnerable. Vigilance is necessary to prevent
future terrorist attacks. The United States government has vigilantly
exercised its duty to protect the nation--and so far it has been successful
in preventing subsequent terrorist attacks on American soil. . . .
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to better defend the nation as a direct response to the attacks, but the
government also began using the immigration laws already on the books
in a different way—as a tool of national security.10 Immigration law is
unique in its national security application. The uniqueness of its
application stems from its dual usage as the apparatus for entry into the
United States, as well as the mechanism by which we keep out those who
pose a threat. Viewing “national security” in its broadest meaning, there is
a clear security interest in maintaining the integrity of the borders.
However, there is also an interest—an interest that can compete with the
national security interest—in continuing our role as a beacon of light and
of hope to the world community, our role as a nation where the “tired . . .
poor, [and] huddled masses”11 have refuge. This latter interest is critical
because America is a place where public diplomacy is advanced through
the citizenry’s diversity, which defines us as a people. Not only does a
rational immigration policy bring the best and brightest to the United
States—Albert Einstein as just one famous example12—but it also brings
a diversity of culture that has proven to be our greatest diplomatic
instrument.
This Article explores the relationship between national security and
immigration law—and, specifically, how immigration as the proverbial
“bogeyman”13 has steered immigration law. Part I discusses the definition
of national security, as defining it is a prerequisite to discussing its
implications on immigration law. Part II provides a historical backdrop of
national security and shows how events throughout history have sparked

Id.

Immigration policy and its enforcement are inextricably linked to the
War on Terror. The terrorist hijackers who perpetrated the September 11
attacks entered the United States through authorized visas.

10. See infra Part III.
11. EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883). The poem is inscribed on a
plaque on an inner wall of the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty. Emma Lazarus,
Statue of Liberty National Monument, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov
/stli/learn/historyculture/emma-lazarus.htm [https://perma.cc/K4XM-9UEC] (last
visited Sept. 28, 2016).
12. Not to mention that in 2016 all six of the United States’s Nobel laureates
were immigrants. Rafael Bernal, Amid Debate, All 2016 American Nobel Laureates
Are Immigrants, THE HILL (Oct. 10, 2016, 2:29 PM), http://thehill.com/latino
/300237-all-american-2016-nobel-prize-honorees-are-immigrants [https://perma.cc
/TL2X-RF2D] (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
13. “Bogeyman” is a common allusion to a creature used to frighten people.
Because there is no specific embodiment or image of the bogeyman, the bogeyman
is intangible, but nonetheless, powerful. Like our fear of the bogeyman, our fear of
immigration is irrational and rooted in the unknown.
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“fear” that has led to legal action. Part III of this Article provides the reader
with a picture of the current legal framework of immigration law, including
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. By examining provisions
of the Act and peripheral legal issues, such as providing “material support
to terrorist organizations,”14 this Part addresses the national security
questions of protecting the borders, population control, and the very essence
of the rule of law. Last, Part IV of this Article explores the conflict between
individual rights and national security. This Part attempts to answer the
threshold question of whether it is appropriate that our national security
interests and perhaps exaggerated fear should drive the development and
implementation of immigration law.
I. DEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY
It is necessary first to define “national security” and the term’s
parameters before engaging in a meaningful discussion about the national
security implications of immigration law. Indeed, “if we cannot define
national security, we are less apt to uphold and defend it.”15 The definition
used in the immigration context cannot be so broad as to account for every
crevasse of national interest, yet it cannot be drawn so narrowly that
critical issues are overlooked. One commentator on the subject noted that
“[d]efining national security is more than an academic exercise,”
continuing, “[t]erminology matters. It matters to policy, to process, to the
law and to the application of legal values to all three. Core definitions of
national security inform how . . . lawyers interpret the application of
specific statutory definitions tied to national security.”16
The question, “What is ‘national security’?” is one that is rooted in the
very founding of the United States.17 Yet, not until the last 20 years have
14. 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1) (2012).
15. JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
FOR PERILOUS T IMES 20 (2007).
16. Id. Judge James E. Baker was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces in 2000 and retired in 2015. Judge Baker previously served as
Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council
(NSC) from 1997 to 2000, where he advised the President, the National Security
Advisor, and the NSC staff on U.S. and international law involving national security,
including the use of force, the law of armed conflict, intelligence activities, foreign
assistance, terrorism, arms control, human rights, and international law enforcement.
Judge Baker is now a Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown Law Center. See
James Baker, GEORGETOWN LAW, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/bakerjames.cfm# [https://perma.cc/3KFY-U7KR] (last visited Oct. 16, 2016).
17. See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1 (4th ed. 2007)
(stating that “[i]t might appear that national security issues have only recently
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the battle lines truly been drawn.18 As a legal matter, there is no single,
official, and agreed upon definition of national security. The two most
predominate national security laws, the National Security Act 19 and the
PATRIOT Act,20 are totally devoid of a formal definition. Without a
formal legal definition, the executive branch has the flexibility to act in the
name of some amorphous notion that is national security—in other words,
to “shoot first and ask questions later.” Different areas of the law, however,
do place the term into a framework with legal consequences. Most relevant
to the discussion at hand, the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”)
states that “‘national security’ means the national defense, foreign
relations, or economic interests of the United States.”21
Beyond the lack of any codified definition, different presidents have
highlighted their own views of the term.22 President Barack Obama’s
definition of national security accounts for a more comprehensive
worldview than those of his predecessors.23 In President Obama’s view,
America’s national security interests encompass not only the security of
the United States and its citizens, but also the security of its allies and
partners.24 He has emphasized a “strong, innovative, and growing U.S.
economy in an open international economic system promoting opportunity
and prosperity, respect for universal values at home and around the world,
and an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes
peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet
global challenges.”25
taken center stage in our national life. In fact, they have held that position
periodically throughout our history”); see also Mark Shulman, The Progressive
Era Origins of the National Security Act, 104 DICK. L. REV. 289, 291 (noting that
this issue was debated at universities in the late 1700s).
18. DYCUS, supra note 17, at 2 (stating that “the lines between foreign and
domestic issues of national security, and even between peace and war, have
seriously eroded: [e]very foreign issue has domestic ramifications, and the
country lives in a seemingly permanent [War]”).
19. See generally National Security Act § 101, 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2012).
20. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act [PATRIOT Act], Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 31,
42, 47, 49, 50, and 51 U.S.C.). The Act was signed into law on October 26, 2001.
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(d)(2).
22. See infra notes 23–33.
23. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2010),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strate
gy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HCV-RFAQ].
24. See generally id. at 1–5.
25. Id. at 7.
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Before that global definition held prevalence, President George W.
Bush stressed those protections more easily connected to the physical
homeland and its people.26 He stressed protection of the United States’s
constitutional system of government, the military interests of the United
States “around the globe,” and the economy as fundamental aspects of
national security.27 President Bush was focused more on hard-power
objectives in defining America’s security concerns than President
Obama.28
President Clinton offered a broader definition, believing that there
were national security concerns when an issue generally concerned “our
people, our territory and our way of life.”29 The Clinton camp often
defined national security as events that
(1) [t]hreaten drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to
degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2)
threaten significantly to narrow the range of policy choices
available to the government of a state or to private,
nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within
the state.30
Given the scope of the Clinton administration’s definition of a
“national security threat,” global warming and immigration could easily
be placed into that category.31 Despite that seemingly expansionist
language, the Clinton definition actually focused more on the people of
26. President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive-1,
Organization of the National Security Council System, No. 0211, at 2 (Feb. 13,
2001) [hereinafter Presidential Directive-1].
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Think Again: Soft Power, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Feb. 3, 2006), http://foreignpolicy.com/2006/02/23/think-again-soft-power/ [https:
//perma.cc/BBZ9-DNQ2].
29. See THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW
CENTURY, at iii, 1 (1999) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY FOR A NEW CENTURY],
http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB2M-F7P2].
30. BAKER, supra note 15, at 18; see also NATIONAL SECURITY FOR A NEW
CENTURY, supra note 29. This definition was laid down first by Richard Ullman,
Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs. See Richard Ullman, Redefining
Security, 8 INT’L SECURITY 129, 133 (1983).
31. NATIONAL SECURITY FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 29, at 13, 39.
Some would argue that that concerns about global warming and immigration may
have motivated the administration to define “national security event” so broadly.
Id.
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the United States, rather than President Bush’s general “interests around
the globe.”32 Therefore, President Clinton’s broader definition of national
security is more appropriate for the subject at hand.
II. THE FEAR OF VIOLENCE AND ITS NOT SO SUBTLE
EFFECT ON IMMIGRATION LAWS
Fear in response to immigration is not a uniquely American experience.
Throughout history and across the globe, the “native” population has met
waves of immigrants with vitriol.33 Today, the European Union is becoming
much more nationalistic as Europe grapples with a migration surge.34 Just
as the events of September 11, 2001 sparked fear in America, the European
“economic malaise” prompted fear across Europe.35 Those fears have only
been heightened with further immigration from Northern Africa and have
already resulted in xenophobic and fascist demonstrations.36 The
emergence of Golden Dawn in Greece is especially startling. The open air
military formations in Syntagma Square, at which those present “gave a
hearty rendition of the Nazi Horst Wessel song—albeit with Greek lyrics,”

32. Presidential Directive-1, supra note 26.
33. See, e.g., BRYAN ROMMEL RUIZ, AMERICAN HISTORY GOES TO THE
MOVIES 148–51 (2011) (describing the tendency, as dramatically portrayed in
Martin Scorsese’s Gangs of New York (2002), for “native” populations to be hostile
toward immigrant communities and for the various immigrant communities, as well,
to be hostile toward one another). The “immigrant” is but a manifestation of the
“other,” of whom we are socialized to be afraid. See also Tom R. Burns et al., The
Social Construction of Xenophobia and Other-isms 1–3 (Apr. 5, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript), https://cordis.europa.eu/pub/improving/docs/ser_racism_burns.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/LSM2-4T2K] (“[A] community or group distinguishes . . . between itself as
a system and its ‘environment.’ In interacting with internal and/or external agents which
are judged or perceived as different, possibly dangerous or threatening, the
community or group asserts, possibly re-constructs, its identity by differentiating
itself form ‘other.’”).
34. Michael Birnbaum & Griff Witte, ‘People in Europe are Full of Fear’ Over
Refugee Influx, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/hungarys-leader-to-migrants-please-dont-come/2015/09/03/d5244c6d-53d8-4e82b9d7-35ec41ca2944_story.html [https://perma.cc/F878-VUAE]; see also Hate
Knows No Borders, LEADERSHIP CONF., http://www.civilrights.org/publications
/hatecrimes/borders.html [https://perma.cc/72X7-7TWP] (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
35. Rachel Donadio, Fears About Immigrants Deepen Divisions in Europe,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/13/world/Europe
/13europe.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5J3Z-R859].
36. Birnbaum & Witte, supra note 34.
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shocked observers.37 One article described that political party as a group
who “feels untouchable . . . [and] fears nothing”38—an interesting point
given that fear, at least in part, motivated the group’s growing popularity.
In the U.S., national security has been an inherent aspect of immigration
law since the founding of the country.39 In 1798, ten years after the
Constitution was ratified, the country’s fear of violence advanced a political
message—terrorism—and manifested itself in the Alien and Sedition Acts
of 1798, which authorized the President to arrest and deport any alien
noncitizen who was deemed dangerous and a threat to national security.40 In
1903, the fear of immigration was revived after the assassination of
President McKinley by an anarchist from a Polish immigrant family.41 In
response to this assassination, Congress immediately enacted laws that
allowed the government to remove any anarchist from the United States—
the irony that Leon Czolgosz, President McKinley’s assassin, was born in
Detroit and was a United States citizen and thus would not have been
affected by the new statute was lost on Congress.42

37. Helena Smith, SS Songs and Anti-Semitism: The Week Golden Dawn
Turned Openly Nazi, GUARDIAN (Jun. 7, 2014, 4:14 PM), http://www.theguardian
.com/world/2014/jun/07/greece-golden-dawn-fascism-threat-to-democracy [https:
//perma.cc/RW4U-YGLU].
38. Id.
39. See generally Will Maslow, Recasting Deportation Law: Proposals for
Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 311–12 (1956).
40. Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired in 1800). In addition to
this national law, certain colonies had deportation laws codified from their
conception. Indeed, the Plymouth Colony had a law in 1639 that provided for the
deportation of paupers to Europe. Maslow, supra note 39, at 311 n.14. In the
Massachusetts Colony, there was a 1647 law that banned the immigration of
Roman Catholic priests and ordered the deportation of any found in the colony.
Id. See also Alien and Sedition Acts, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (Apr. 21, 2006),
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Alien.html [https://perma.cc/ZS2KEQZF] (stating that the Alien and Sedition Acts consisted of four laws passed by
the Federalist-controlled Congress in anticipation of war with France). The acts
did three things: (1) they altered the residency requirement for American
citizenship; (2) they allowed the President to imprison or deport aliens; and (3)
they restricted speech. Id.
41. See Maslow, supra note 39, at 313 n.25 (“The assassination of President
McKinley prompted the provision relating to anarchists. The Secretary of
Commerce and Labor was empowered to take into custody and deport those aliens
whom he was ‘satisfied’ were here illegally. No judicial review was provided.”);
Act of March 2, 1903, ch. 1012, § 20, 32 Stat. 1213, 1218.
42. See Maslow, supra note 39, at 313 n.25.
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During and just before World War I, the growing fear over subversives
and radical aliens like Emma Goldman resulted in reinforcing legislation
against such individuals.43 In 1919, Emma Goldman, along with 248 other
aliens, was deported under the 1918 Alien Act.44 Goldman was born in
Russia, but came to the United States in 1885 at the age of 16.45 Goldman
was a vocal opponent of America’s potential involvement in World War
I.46 Therefore, when the U.S. finally entered the war in 1917, her activism
was considered a threat to national security, and she was sentenced to 18
months in federal prison.47 Upon her release, J. Edgar Hoover, the Director
of the Justice Department’s General Intelligence Division—the forbearer
of the FBI—ordered Goldman’s re-arrest and persuaded courts to deny
Goldman’s citizenship claims.48 Because of that further action, she was
eligible for deportation under the Alien Act, which allowed for the
expulsion of any alien found to be an anarchist.49
Other dissident aliens were interned as a result of their anti-war
campaigns, and an anti-German sentiment prevailed across the country.50
Germans and German Americans were suspected of being disloyal for
simply being like, acting like, or speaking like Germans. For example, the
state of Nebraska enacted a law prohibiting the teaching of languages other
than English.51 The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the law, affirming the
conviction of a teacher who had been teaching German to a juvenile who
was not yet passed the eighth grade, which was a condition of the statute.52
The court’s argument in defending the statute reflects the pervasive antiGerman sentiment of that time: “The legislature had seen the baneful
43. Ruchir Patel, Immigration Legislation Pursuant to Threats to U.S.
National Security, 32 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL’Y 83, 84 (2003) (“Under wartime
conditions, Congress passed the so-called Anarchists Act of October 16, 1918,
which ordered the deportation of alien anarchists residing within the United States
and made it a felony punishable by imprisonment for those deported to reenter or
attempt to reenter the country. This Act was amended by the June 5, 1920 Act
which included in the anarchist class aliens who advocate ‘the unlawful damage,
injury or destruction of property, or sabotage.’”).
44. Deportation of Emma Goldman as a Radical “Alien,” JEWISH WOMEN’S
ARCHIVE, http://jwa.org/thisweek/dec/21/1919/emma-goldman [https://perma.cc
/Z8AV-D7J9] (last visited Dec. 26, 2015).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Patel, supra note 43, at 84.
51. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397–98 (1923).
52. Id.
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effects of permitting foreigners, who had taken residence in this country,
to rear and educate their children in the language of their native land. The
result of that condition was found to be inimical to our own safety.”53 In
Meyer v. Nebraska, however, the U.S. Supreme Court found the statute
unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, though noting that the legislature’s intent was
“easy to appreciate.”54
The anti-German prejudice was not limited to laws preventing the
teaching of German. That prejudice eventually led to the gathering of
6,300 German aliens into internment camps during World War I under the
President’s summary powers and to unsanctioned lynchings.55 The state’s
action in setting up internment camps would set the precedent for Japanese
internment 20 years later.56 In addition, “the regulations governing the
remaining Germans were tightened, requiring them to register and
forbidding them to move without official permission.”57 Indeed, the fear
that Germans would “threaten the ‘American way of life’” spilled over
into immigration reform as well as violence toward or internment of
German immigrants.58
This climate of fear continued after World War I, but that fear was
directed toward a different “other”—toward Communists rather than the
now-vanquished Germans.59 The focus on Communists began in earnest

53. Id.
54. Id. at 400. The Court commented that Nebraska enacted its prohibition on
teaching German for the purpose of fostering nationalism after World War I
between the United States and Germany. But, prohibition of teaching German in
schools was too extreme. It is important to note that the court did not say that there
was no legitimate purpose. In fact, the Court said, “[t]he desire of the Legislature
to foster a homogenous people with American ideals . . . is easy to appreciate.”
Id. at 402.
55. See ARNOLD KRAMMER, UNDUE PROCESS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
AMERICA’S GERMAN ALIEN INTERNEES 14–15 (1977).
56. Patel, supra note 43, at 84; see also infra text accompanying notes 65–69.
57. Patel, supra note 43, at 84–85.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 85 (stating that “[t]he climate of repression established during
World War I continued against Communists even after the conclusion of the
war”). Communism took on prominence on the world stage and thus a status
worthy of fearing with the Bolshevik Revolution and that Communist Party’s
command of such a large landmass, immense resources, and huge population. See
generally 3 EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917-1923
(W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1985) (discussing the Bolshevik’s rise to power,
culminating with the signing of the Treaty of Brest–Litovsk, which saw the
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after immigrants, who were members of the Communist Party, carried out
a politically motivated bombing of U.S. Attorney General Mitchell
Palmer’s house.60 As a result, 3,000 aliens, then suspected of being
members of the Communist Party, were detained for deportation.61
As the 20th century progressed, the fear of aliens did as well. Indeed,
World War II brought a robust movement pushing for the government to
create a national alien registration system to protect the homeland.62 In
1940, the Alien Registration Act was enacted.63 The Act mandated the
registration and fingerprinting of aliens and provided grounds for
deportation for certain acts, including possessing a sawed-off shotgun or
helping other aliens illegally enter the United States.64 These actions
toward aliens, however, although certainly terrible, pale in comparison to
the sending of 110,000 people, mostly Japanese immigrants who were in
fact American citizens, to internment camps for the duration of the war.65
The authority for the Japanese internment was derived from Executive
Order No. 9066, issued on February 19, 1942 by President Franklin
Roosevelt.66 The order enabled the Secretary of War to designate areas
within the United States as military zones from which “any and all persons
may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to
enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the
Secretary of War . . . may impose in his discretion.”67 The constitutionality
of the order and the actions of the U.S. government with respect to
interning Americans of Japanese ancestry were challenged in the landmark
Central Powers of Europe acknowledge the Bolshevik government of Soviet
Russia on the world stage).
60. 3,000 Arrested in Nation-Wide Round-Up of ‘Reds’; Palmer Directs Raids
in 35 Cities; 650 Seized Here, N.Y. TRIB., Jan. 3, 1920, at 1.
61. Id.; see also Deportation of Emma Goldman as a Radical “Alien,” supra
note 44.
62. 3,000 Arrested in Nation-Wide Round-Up of ‘Reds,’ supra note 60.
63. Alien Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385).
64. Patel, supra note 43, at 85.
65. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 38,1407 (Feb. 25, 1942) (President
Roosevelt issued this executive order after declaring war with Japan.); Paula
Branca-Santos, Injustice Ignored: The Interment of Italian-American During
World War II, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 151 (2001) (“After President Roosevelt
signed Executive Order 9066, General DeWitt ‘designated California,
Washington, Oregon and Southern Arizona as military zones and, to prevent
sabotage and espionage . . . he ordered the relocation of persons of Japanese
descent residing in those areas.’”).
66. Exec. Order No. 9066, supra note 65.
67. Id.
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Supreme Court case Korematsu v. United States.68 In Korematsu, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 9066,
holding that military urgency necessitated governmental action against
Japanese Americans for the sake of protecting the country against
espionage.69 Although Korematsu is not directly related to immigration, as
the vast majority of detainees were in fact U.S. citizens, it is related to
national security jurisprudence and illustrates the overall thesis of this
Article—that fear drives policy.
After the conclusion of World War II, the culture of distrust toward
aliens continued and, just as it had after World War I, refocused on
Communists, starting the “Red Scare.”70 This anti-Communist sentiment
directly led to the enactment of the 1952 McCarran–Walter Act, known
today as the Immigration and Nationality Act, which commenced an
ideological litmus test for alien admission.71 This law provided for a
system by which immigrants and foreign visitors could be denied entry to
the United States because of their political philosophies—in this particular
example, for being a Communist.72
Subsequent case law held that mere membership or other affiliation
with the Communist Party was sufficient grounds for deportation73 and
that knowledge or support of the Communist Party’s advocacy of violence

68. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that state laws restricting the rights of
people based on race are subject to strict scrutiny and would only be upheld if
they further a “pressing public necessity”). In Korematsu, because it was a time
of war, there was justification for excluding Japanese Americans from their homes
in the particular area. Because the U.S. Government lacked the resources to make
individual determinations of loyalty, excluding Korematsu, regardless of his
loyalty was justified. The Court applied the holding of the prior decision,
Hirabayashi v. United States, and held that concerns over preventing espionage
and sabotage constituted a “pressing public necessity.” Id. at 216.
69. Id. at 218.
70. Patel, supra note 43, at 85.
71. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–
1537 (2012)); see H.R. REP. NO. 82,1365 (1952); SEN. REP. NO. 82,1137 (1952);
Patel, supra note 43, at 85.
72. Patel, supra note 43, at 85.
73. See Title v. INS, 322 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1963); Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d 824
(6th Cir. 1970).
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was not a prerequisite for such deportation.74 In Carlson v. Landon,75 the
Supreme Court ruled that the use of force to achieve political control
constitutes a sufficient basis for Congress to expel alien Communists
under its power to regulate the exclusion, admission, and expulsion of
aliens.76 The Court relied on the purpose of the Internal Security Act,77
which was “to deport all alien Communists as a menace to the security of
the United States.”78 With that policy as guidance, the Court concluded
that the discretion in the Attorney General “was certainly broad enough to
justify his detention of all these parties without bail as a menace to the
public interest.”79 The Court also ruled that the government should not be
required to also show “specific acts of sabotage or incitement to subversive
action.”80 The dissent argued that if Congress can authorize the
imprisonment of alien Communists because they are dangerous, Congress
can also authorize the imprisonment of citizen Communists on the same
ground.81
74. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S.
115 (1957) (holding that a record disclosing an alien’s past membership in a
Communist Party and the alien’s work in a Communist bookstore was not
sufficient to support the order of deportation as an alien who had been a member
of the Communist Party of the U.S.); Schleich v. Butterfield, 252 F.2d 191 (6th
Cir. 1958) (holding that because Schleich freely joined the Communist Party
knowing that the party operated as a distinct and active political organization,
there was sufficient evidence to constitute him as a member of the Communist
Party within the terms of the Act); Grubisich v. Esperdy, 175 F. Supp. 445
(D.C.N.Y. 1959) (holding that deportation was justified because there was
evidence that warranted a finding that the alien had a meaningful association with
the Communist Party and he did not have a valid reentry permit).
75. 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (holding that there was no abuse of discretion in
denial of bail; placing of discretion as to grant of bail in the Attorney General was
constitutional; denial of bail did not violate constitutional prohibition against
excessive bail; and on re-arrest of an alien who had been released on bail, a new
warrant should be obtained); see also Prentis v. Manoogia, 16 F.2d 422, 424 (6th
Cir. 1926) (holding that if it is said that the official may give a privilege to an
applicant, the words are presumptively permissive only, but if it is said that the
applicant may have the privilege, the words are presumptively mandatory upon
the official); but see United States ex rel. Zapp v. District Director, 120 F.2d 762,
765 (2nd Cir. 1941) (holding that release is discretionary with the Attorney
General given the language “may be released under a bond”).
76. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 535–36.
77. Internal Security Act of 1950 § 23.
78. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 541.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 552.
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Today, the changes to immigration law do not stem from wars, per
se—kinetic or cold—but from the threat of terrorism and the United
States’s struggle to defeat extremism. Following September 11, 2001, “the
Department of Homeland Security [DHS] has assumed responsibility for
immigration and immigrant policy and has subordinated these concerns to
separate larger terrorism policy goals.”82 As a result, the Bush
Administration’s terrorism policy, “designed to prevent other terrorist
attacks, dramatically altered the way the nation treats people seeking to
enter the United States, and those noncitizens who are already here.”83 The
Obama administration has largely carried on this policy.84
It is not, of course, that immigration policy has or “should operate
entirely separate from terrorism policy.”85 In contrast, immigration law
and national security policy have overlapped throughout American
history.86 Since September 11th, however, this overlap has developed into
a single body of law in which the fear of terrorism drives the
implementation of current immigration law, as well as the development of
new law, as a tool of national security policy. At the least, any
conversation about immigration policy must now always take place
against the backdrop of national security policy.87
Consider that before September 11th, the immigration system was
used almost exclusively to regulate the movement of aliens across U.S.
borders.88 Today, that same immigration system has become, in addition
to a means of regulating movement of aliens, a tool for criminal
investigations and gathering intelligence.89 The immigration system has
become a frequently used antiterrorism mechanism in large part because

82. Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping
Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (2004).
83. Id.
84. See generally NATIONAL SECURITY FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 29.
85. Tumlin, supra note 82, at 1177.
86. Id.
87. The United States Citizen and Immigration Services (“CIS”) has been
under intense scrutiny since issuing visa approval letters to the September 11,
2001 hijackers six months after the attacks. Mark Potter & Rich Phillips, Six
Months After Sept. 11, Hijackers’ Visa Approval Letter Received, CNN (Mar. 13,
2002, 5:07 AM), http://archives.cnn.com/2002/us.03/12.inv.flight.school.visas/
[https://perma.cc/48WH-W8ZD].
88. See Tumlin, supra note 82, at 1178–79.
89. See Bill Ong Hing, Misusing Immigration Policies in the Name of
Homeland Security, 6 NEW CENTENNIAL REV. 195, 217–18 (2006).
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it is a system of civil, rather than criminal, procedures.90 Thus, using the
immigration system to detain suspected terrorists for violations of
immigration law circumvents due process safeguards that would otherwise
apply in a criminal context.91
Historically, fear of subversives—and, all too often, of immigrants—
has led to immigration reform of some type, responding to the particular
threat of the day.92 Although not a new concept, these reforms and their
continuing utilization to uphold national security objectives became a
critical aspect of the government’s Global War on Terror.93 In light of this
utilization, Part III surveys the current legal framework surrounding
national security and how immigration tools are used to further national
security objectives.
III. NATIONAL SECURITY, FEAR, AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF IMMIGRATION LAW
Soon after assuming the role of immigration enforcement along with
the duty to effectuate terrorism policy in the United States, the DHS began
using its immigration powers to fight domestic terrorism.94 This shift in
policy is sensible, considering that the hijackers who perpetrated the
September 11th attacks entered the United States with “valid” visas.95 The
9/11 Commission Report96 disclosed that slipshod visa screening had
permitted most of the hijackers to enter the United States with fraudulent
passports and false statements on their visa applications.97 The

90. See Asli Ü Bali, Changes in Immigration Law and Practice after
September 11: Practitioner’s Perspective, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS
J., 161, 163 (2003).
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 3–12 and accompanying text.
93. See Ved P. Nanda, International Law Implications of the United States’
“War on Terror,” 37 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 513, 533–34 (2009).
94. See Tumlin, supra note 82, at 1178–79. The majority of immigration
enforcement comes from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement both agencies of DHS. Our History,
USCIS.GOV, https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history [https://perma.cc/KUR6PP3U] (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).
95. de Leon, supra note 9, at 115–16.
96. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT (2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SJR-62DV].
97. See de Leon, supra note 9, at 116.
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Commission Report concluded that the authorities could have intercepted
as many as 15 of the 19 hijackers if proper procedures had been observed.98
More recently, in 2014, the fear that terrorists could gain entry into the
U.S. through a hole in the border—like those holes known to be used by
Mexican and other Latin-American illegal immigrants who cross for
work—was exacerbated when prayer rugs were found on the Texas side
of the U.S.–Mexico border.99 Texas’s Lieutenant Governor David
Dewhurst claimed that a note reading, “See you in New York,” was found
on the border as well.100 He suggested Islamic extremists might have left
the prayer rug behind when entering Texas.101 Dewhurt’s statements
echoed what Texas Governor Rick Perry had hinted at earlier, saying that
there was a “real possibility” that extremists affiliated with ISIS could
cross into the U.S. through Mexico.102
It follows, then, that a vital part of the nation's national security plan
should be to prevent terrorists from entering the United States and to
reduce the likelihood that America will face another terrorist attack.
Moreover, when individuals who wish to do harm to the United States or
her people are found in the United States, the ability to remove or detain
those individuals is absolutely vital from a national security perspective.
Thus, an understanding of the current immigration and national security
legal framework is essential to develop good policy. This portion of the
Article will focus on the exclusion and deportation grounds under the INA
for national security threats, including espionage, terrorist activity, and
foreign policy. Section A will also cover summary exclusion for national
security reasons and the Alien Terrorist Removal Court.

98. Id.; see also THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 96, at 384 (“[A]s
many as 15 of the 19 hijackers were potentially vulnerable to interception by
border authorities. Analyzing their characteristic travel documents and travel
patterns could have allowed authorities to intercept 4 to 15 hijackers and more
effective use of information available in U.S. government databases could have
identified up to 3 hijackers. Looking back, we can also see that the routine
operations of our immigration laws—that is, aspects of those laws not specifically
aimed at protecting terrorism—inevitably shaped al Qaeda’s planning and
opportunities.”).
99. Julian Aguilar, Dewhurst Tells D.C. Crowd Prayer Rugs Found on Border,
TEXAS TRIB. (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/09/26/dewhursttells-dc-crowd-prayer-rugs-found-border/ [https://perma.cc/46C5-49U5].
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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A. Removal, Holds, and Denial of Benefits
Historically, the INA has provided for both the exclusion and
deportation (“removal”) of aliens from the United States who were
deemed to pose a national security risk.103 In June 1946, Attorney General
Tom Clark spoke to the Chicago Bar Association and claimed that the
United States faced a plot by Communists.104 He described Communists
as “outside ideologists . . . who sought to divide the country.”105 Shortly
after his speech, Clark turned his attention to deportation.106 It is clear that
the words this high-ranking official spoke stemmed from the fear that
captivated the nation at a tumultuous time. Those words led to action—
action that triggered consequences still felt today.
The INA focused on removing aliens who were associated with
organizations that advocated Communism or overthrowing the
government.107 In 1990, the INA added bans with respect to terrorists,
aliens who presented adverse foreign policy consequences, and the
catchall provision of aliens who pose a national security risk, which
includes aliens that are involved in espionage, sabotage, and sedition.108
These types of ideological elimination were challenged in the courts, and
between 1951 and 1963, the United States Supreme Court routinely upheld
these statutes against constitutional attack.109 The Court specifically
103. There is a legal difference between the terms “exclusion” and
“deportation.” “Exclusion” refers to being denied entry into the United States, while
“deportation” means that an alien is removed while in the United States. One can be
excluded while in the United States, however, if not allowed to be here in the first
place. Because of overlapping meaning, the term removal is used throughout this
Article. Deportation, USCIS.gov, https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/deportation
[https://perma.cc/4JDK-ZV2H] (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
104. DAN KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 200 (2007).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D) (2012) (stating that “[a]ny immigrant
who is or has been a member of or affiliated with the Communist or any other
totalitarian party (or subdivision or affiliate thereof), domestic or foreign, is
inadmissible”).
108. See id. § 1251(a).
109. See Gastellum-Ouinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469 (1963) (holding that
because the government did not sustain its burden of establishing that the
petitioner was a meaningful member of the party, the deportation order could not
stand); Niukkanen v. McAlexander, 362 U.S. 390 (1960) (finding that the district
court’s rulings that the petitioner was subject to deportation as a member of the
Communist Party and that the petitioner perjured himself when he denied
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upheld those laws limiting Communist Party membership and affiliation,
holding them to be legal and necessary.110 To date, these decisions have
never been overruled.
At the conclusion of the Cold War, America’s enemy, its “other,” was
ill-defined. The world, seemingly overnight, had gone from one in which
the U.S. and its allies opposed and were opposed by the Soviet Union and
its allies to one in which the U.S. and its allies were opposed to whatever
bogeyman was to fill the vacuum. Congress diligently updated the
ideological provisions in the INA with new provisions consistent with the
nation’s modern-day threats—threats that were decidedly less concrete
than the Soviet Union’s had been during the Cold War.111 Specifically, in
1990, most of the 1950s language dealing with advocacy and membership
provisions was replaced with language dealing with broad national
security concerns, terrorism, and foreign policy.112 These new provisions
were generally “conduct-oriented” and focused on acts such as material
support.113
1. The New Enemy: Defining a National Security Threat
For immigration law, 1996 was a watershed year. The Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) was passed in
response to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, an act of domestic terror,
membership were not clearly erroneous); Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115
(1957) (concluding that the record showing the alien’s past membership in the
Communist Party and work in a Communist bookstore was insubstantial to
support the order of deportation based on the alien having been a member of the
Communist Party of the United States); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954)
(holding that if the petitioner had joined the Communist Party without knowledge
of the party’s advocacy of violence, he was deportable as a party member absent
a claim that he joined the party “accidentally, artificially, or unconsciously in
appearance only”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (ruling that
the Alien Registration Act of 1940 did not deprive aliens of due process of law in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, it did not infringe on freedoms of speech and
assembly under the First amendment, and that it was not invalid as an ex post
facto law); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 535–36 (1952) (concluding that
there was no abuse of discretion in denial of bail; placing of discretion to grant
bail in the Attorney General was not unconstitutional; denial of bail was
constitutional; and on re-arrest of the alien released on bail, a new warrant should
be obtained).
110. See, e.g., Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594–95.
111. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3), 1227(a)(4)(A)–(B) (1996).
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and imposed sweeping immigration policy by expanding the grounds for
deportation and narrowing the provisions for discretionary relief.114 The
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City took
the lives of 146 people, including 15 children.115 That tragedy, combined
with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the siege at Waco, Texas,
created just the political environment—emotionally charged, fearful of the
next tragedy, and reactionary—necessary to pass such legislation.116 Also
in 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), which focused on the
apprehension and expeditious removal of undocumented immigrants.117
Despite having the basic framework established, the U.S. government
lacked the ability to confront national security threats—terrorism—
through its immigration laws directly, something that, after September 11,
2001, would change dramatically and with incredible haste.118
Relevant to this topic, the AEDPA and the IIRIRA specifically
changed the methods by which suspected terrorist aliens and other national
security threats could be detained and removed.119 Later, the PATRIOT
Act and REAL ID Act were passed into law, making even more
substantive changes to the INA’s terrorism provisions.120

114. See Benjamin R. Orye III, The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus Reform,
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a Judgment of
Conviction Becomes Final for the Purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2255(1), 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 441, 451–53 (2002); AEDPA, IIRIRA, the 1990’s & the Clintons (A Betrayal
of Democratic Values), DAILY KOS (Feb. 3, 2008, 6:57 PM), http://www.daily
kos.com/story/2008/02/03/449127/- [https://perma.cc/3RJ3-ZHK4].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Gwendolyn M. Holinka, Q-T-M-T: The Denial of Humanitarian
Relief for Aggravated Felons, 13 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 405, 438 (1999).
118. Patel, supra note 43, at 86–87.
119. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
120. The PATRIOT Act is an acronym for the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered
sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 31, 42, 47, 49, 50, and 51 U.S.C.). The REAL ID Act
was a rider, formally Division B of H.R. 1268, the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief,
2005. On May 11, 2005, the President signed into law the REAL ID Act, Pub. L.
No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–
1107).
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The INA now not only mandates the removal of aliens who engage in
the standard national security threats such as espionage,121 sabotage,122 the
transfer of restricted technology or information—that is, spying123—and
membership in Communist or totalitarian parties, but it also mandates
removal for actions deemed to be “terrorist activity.”124 The removal of an
alien for terrorist activities is set forth in sections 212(a)(3)(B) and
212(a)(3)(F) of the INA.125 More specifically, the INA’s mandatory
removal of aliens is contingent upon its own definition of what it means to
“engage in terrorist activity”:
(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances
indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a
terrorist activity;
(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;
(III) to gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity;
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for-121. Section 212(a)(3)(A) of the INA mandates that an individual who is
reasonably believed to be seeking admission into the United States to engage
solely, principally, or incidentally in
any activity (I) to violate any law of the United States relating to
espionage or sabotage or (II) to violate or evade any law prohibiting the
export from the United States of goods, technology, or sensitive
information . . . any other unlawful activity, or . . . any activity [that
intends to] overthrow [the] Government of the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A) (2012). A 1999 decision from the Board of Immigration
Appeals construed INA section 237(a)(4)(A)(i) in a case involving a Cuban spy
who failed to register under 50 U.S.C. § 851. In re Luis-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N.
Dec. 747 (BIA 1999) (addressing section 241(a)(4)(A(i), which is now codified
in section 237(a)(4)(A)(i) of the INA). In Luis-Rodriguez, the Board held that no
conviction under the espionage statute was necessary. Id. at 756.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. The Immigration Act of 1990 left Communist Party members and affiliates
excludable, but not deportable: “Any immigrant who is or has been a member of or
affiliated with the Communist or any other totalitarian party (or subdivision
thereof), domestic or foreign, is excludable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D). See also id.
§ 1101(a)(37) (defining “totalitarian party” to cover dictatorships); H.R. Rep. No.
101-955, at 131 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 6796
(joint conference report issued with the 1990 Act).
125. Section 212(a)(3)(B) and (F) of the INA pertain to the inadmissibility of
an alien; the REAL ID Act incorporated these provisions in their entirety by
reference in the deportation provision of the INA in section 237(a)(4)(B). See 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (“Any alien who is described in subparagraph (B) or (F)
of section 1182(a)(3) is deportable.”).
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(aa) a terrorist activity;
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II);
or
(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the
solicitor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the
organization was a terrorist organization;
(V) to solicit any individual-(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this subsection;
(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization . . . or
(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should
know, affords material support, including a safe house,
transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other
material financial benefit, false documentation or identification,
weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological
weapons), explosives, or training-(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should
know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity; . . .126
“Terrorist activity” is then defined as follows:
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an
aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or
continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third
person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain
from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the
release of the individual seized or detained.
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as
defined in section 1116(b)(4) of Title 18) or upon the liberty of
such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any-(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device,
or
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other
than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger,
directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to
cause substantial damage to property.

126. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
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(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.127
In addition to the definition above, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
has defined “a terrorist” as any person whom a consular officer or the
Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe is engaged in or is
likely to engage in terrorist activity.128 The DOJ has defined the term
“reasonable ground” as equivalent to “probable cause.”129 Aliens who
have received terrorist training from a designated terrorist organization are
also removable, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339(c)(1).130 A powerful
catchall provision also allows the removal of aliens that the Secretary of
State or the Attorney General determine to have been “associated with a
terrorist organization” and who “intend while in the United States to
engage solely, principally, or incidentally in activities that could endanger
the welfare, safety, or security of the United States.”131
2. Denial of Relief
In addition to being removed, aliens who are national security threats
are also ineligible for immigration relief and other benefits.132 For
instance, individuals who are removable under section 237(a)(4)(B) of the
INA cannot adjust their status.133 The same holds true for asylum; there is
a mandatory denial for aliens who are deemed national security risks,

127. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
128. See Matter of U-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 355, 356–57 (BIA 2002) (holding
that section 412 of the PATRIOT Act does not change the standard for
determining whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is
engaged or will engage in terrorist activity or whether there are reasonable
grounds to believe that he is a threat to national security).
129. Id.
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VIII).
131. Id. § 1182 (a)(3)(F). This provision bars entry; REAL ID Act section 105,
however, extended that bar to deportation cases.
132. Aliens deportable under section 237(a)(4)(B) of the Act are ineligible to
adjust status. Id. § 1227(a)(4)(B). Section 237(a)(4)(B) of the Act renders any
alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after admission engages in any
terrorist activity, as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) of the Act, deportable. Id.
Under section 245(c)(6) of the Act, persons who are deportable under section
237(a)(4)(B) of the Act are ineligible to adjust status under section 245(a) of the
Act. Id. § 1255(c)(6). Any person who is deportable under section 237(a)(4)(B)
of the Act is also ineligible to adjust status under section 245(i) of the Act. Id. §
1227(a)(4)(B); 8 C.F.R. 245.10(g) (2016).
133. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B).
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regardless of whether they would otherwise have a valid claim.134 Aliens
who fall into the national security threat category are also barred from all
forms of cancellation,135 voluntary departure,136 and withholding of
removal.137
3. Denial of Adjudication
In addition to being denied relief on national security grounds, aliens
who apply for certain immigration benefits can have the adjudication of
their applications “withheld.”138 Specifically, aliens who apply to have
their status adjusted—for example, from that of a refugee to that of a
lawful permanent resident—might have the adjudication of that
application suspended or “withheld” if that alien poses or is suspected of
posing a national security risk. Section 209 of the INA authorizes the
Secretary of the DHS to adjust certain refugees in the United States to
permanent residence status.139 The Supreme Court case, Elkins v. Moreno,
makes clear that adjustment of status is expressly subject to the Secretary’s
discretion, holding that “adjustment of status is a matter of grace, not
right.”140 In addition, the statute does not set forth any time frame in which
a determination must be made on whether to adjust an alien’s status.141
This reasoning is exactly what the government argued in Ayyoubi v.
Eric Holder, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.142
The plaintiff, Salahaddin Ayyoubi, was an Iranian refugee who applied for
adjustment of status to become a lawful permanent resident.143 His
134. Section 208(a)(2) and (b)(2) govern this if the alien is inadmissible as a
terrorist under INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(I)–(IV), (VI), and 237(a)(4)(B).
135. Aliens are ineligible for both forms of cancellation under INA section
240A(c). An alien is deportable under INA section 237(a)(4) or inadmissible
under section 212(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(4), 1182(a)(3).
136. Aliens are ineligible for prehearing voluntary departure under INA
section 137(a)(4)(B). 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B).
137. Aliens are ineligible for withholding if deemed a terrorist under INA
section 241(b)(3). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
138. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).
139. Id. In pertinent part, section 209(b) provides: “The Secretary of
Homeland Security . . . in the Secretary’s . . . discretion and under such regulations
as the Secretary . . . may prescribe, may adjust to the status of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence the status of any alien granted asylum.” Id.
140. 435 U.S. 647, 667 (1978).
141. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).
142. Case No. 4:10-CV-1881, 2011 WL 2983462 (E.D. Mo. Jul. 22, 2011),
appeal dismissed, vacated in part, 712 F.2d 387 (2013).
143. Id. at *1.
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application was “on hold” for three years and was pending for a total of
five years before he filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory judgment, asking
the district court judge to find that he was eligible for the adjustment.144
Ayyoubi was granted refugee status after the INS found that he had a wellfounded fear of future persecution by Iranian intelligence authorities.145
When Ayyoubi applied for his adjustment, officials learned that he had
received military training from the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, which
is considered a terrorist organization under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).146
Because of this military training, the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services refused to adjudicate his application for adjustment of
status.147 The district court held that
the plaintiff’s application has been pending only five years . . .
[and] in view of all other circumstances in the case, especially
national security concerns and the high-level, detailed, and
discretionary reviews necessitated by exemption determinations
under [the INA], a three-year delay of adjudication . . . is not
unreasonable as a matter of law.148
Ultimately, the case was dismissed.149
4. Summary Removal
Another tool available to the government to use against aliens who
pose a national security threat is section 235(c) of the INA. 150 Section
235(c) mandates that, in arriving-alien cases, the conventional removal
process halts when it appears that the alien is inadmissible on security or
foreign policy grounds.151 The provision permits the alien’s expeditious
removal without a hearing, which is predicated on confidential national
security information.152 The national security information is not exposed
and judicial review is extremely limited.153 If an arriving alien is deemed
by an immigration officer or judge to have acted in a way prohibited under
any of the espionage, terrorism, or foreign policy provisions, the officer or
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *10.
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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judge must first order the alien removed, report the case to the Attorney
General, and finally halt further inquiry unless directed by the Attorney
General to proceed.154 This system, while unforgiving, has survived
judicial scrutiny.155
If the government decides against using section 235(c) to remove the
alien, then the immigration courts acquire jurisdiction for conventional
removal through section 212(a)(6)(A).
5. Alien Terrorist Removal Court
In 1996, through the enactment of AEDPA, Congress established the
Alien Terrorist Removal Court (“ATRC”), which allows the government
to bring classified information to bear in a removal case on the merits of a
terrorism charge—usually in cases where summary exclusion is not
available because the alien has already been admitted.156 The ATRC
comprises five judges from the district court who are appointed by the
district court’s chief judge.157 The sole function of the ATRC is to conduct
removal proceedings against deportable aliens on national security and
terrorism charges.158 The process begins when the government certifies
that conventional removal proceedings are not adequate because of the
national security threat bringing such proceedings against the alien would
pose.159 The government then files an ex parte application under seal,
arguing that there is probable cause that the alien in question is a terrorist
who poses a national security threat.160

154. See id.
155. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)
(upholding a summary exclusion regulation that, in its essentials, had existed since
1917 and which Congress later enacted in INA section 235(c)). The Court found
that “[u]nder the immigration laws and regulations applicable to all aliens seeking
entry into the United States during the national emergency, [the alien petitioner]
was excluded by the Attorney General without a hearing. In such a case [the
Court] ha[s] no authority to retry the determination of the Attorney General.” Id.
at 546 (internal citation omitted).
156. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1537.
157. Id. § 1532(a).
158. See id.
159. Id. § 1531(1) (“‘[A]lien terrorist’ means any alien described in section
237(a)(4)(B) of this title.”); id. § 1533.
160. Id. §§ 1533(a)(1)–(2). The district judge who reviews the application may
consider ex parte and in camera other information, including classified information,
“presented under oath or affirmation,” or testimony. Id. § 1533(c)(1).
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As soon as the government files the application with the court, the
suspected terrorist alien may be taken into custody.161 While the
proceeding is expedited, the non-classified portion is open to the public.162
The burden of proof on the government is simply a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence, and the rules of evidence do not apply.163
The alien who is in the ATRC does not have the right to seek most forms of
relief, including the rights of asylum, withholding, cancellation, removal,
and voluntary departure.164 A removal order that would violate the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), however, may not be executed.165
Last, once taken into custody, only a legal permanent resident—that is, a
green-card holder—is permitted to petition the Attorney General to be
released.166
This court, as with many of the provisions described,167 is evidence of
an overbroad response prompted by an imprecise fear. The result of such a
response—here, the secret and powerful ATRC—is enough to warrant
scrutiny of its establishment and operation. It is questionable, for example,
whether this court is constitutional. “Tension embroils the ATRC” as the
United States relentlessly combats the constant threat of terrorism on its
soil.168
Congress created the ATRC “to sidestep” constitutional barriers and
consequently created a framework that allows the U.S. Attorney General
to deport a suspicious resident alien without following the procedural
requirements the Constitution demands.169 This framework violates a
resident alien’s Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process.170 First,
the alien is unable to examine the secret evidence or test its accuracy. 171
Second, because the source of the information is secret, the alien is unable
to confront the source and may not know what the basis for a charge is or
how to defend against it.172
161. Id. § 1536(a). This action requires no probable cause finding by the court.
See id.
162. Id. § 1534(a).
163. Id. §§ 1534(g)–(h).
164. Id. § 1534(k).
165. 28 C.F.R. § 200.1 (2016).
166. 8 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(A).
167. See supra Part III.A.2–4.
168. See John Dorsett Niles, Assessing the Constitutionality of the Alien
Terrorist Removal Court, 57 DUKE L. J. 1833, 1834 (2008).
169. Id. at 1834–35.
170. Id. at 1836.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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The options available—removal, holds, and denial of benefits—are all
at the disposal of the government because of the implementing legislation’s
passage in response to instinctual motivations driving the represented and
their representatives alike. There is yet a greater consequence that might
befall an alien, even an alien who has jumped through the hoops, dealt
with the red tape, and taken an oath of allegiance to become a citizen of
the United States.
B. Denaturalization
Even for those individuals who transcend the heavy burdens imposed
by statutes and other bureaucratic procedures and take the oath of
allegiance, the prize can be revoked.173 To revoke someone’s citizenship,
the United States Attorney must institute an action to revoke citizenship in
federal district court by showing that the citizenship was procured
illegally, specifically that the alien concealed a material fact in the
application process or that there was a willful misrepresentation in
obtaining citizenship.174 The burden of proof for the government is proof
by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.175
This tool is powerful in the national security arena—it is also easy to
imagine how massive this weight could be on the shoulders of an
immigrant. An obvious application for denaturalization would be for an
individual who poses a national security threat and who evidence shows
obtained citizenship through marriage fraud. Because of the sensitivity of
the information that proves the alien is a national security threat, the citizen
can be “denaturalized” and removed from the country without the
government even having to speak to the particulars of the national security
concerns.
The driving force behind giving the government the power to revoke
citizenship is a fear that this current citizen will commit an act of
terrorism—fear of a possible future event only made more likely by that
individual’s physical presence on American soil. In 2014, another
Republican presidential contender, Texas Senator Ted Cruz, went even
further, introducing a bill that would strip Americans of their citizenship
if they were deemed to have provided “material assistance” to

173. Amy D. Ronner, Denaturalization and Death: What it Means to Preclude
the Exercise of Judicial Discretion, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 101, 110 (2005).
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012).
175. See In re Cardines, 366 F. Supp. 700, 703 (D. Guam App. Div. 1973).
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organizations designated as terrorist organizations.176 Cruz introduced this
bill in spite of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that stripping an
individual of U.S. citizenship violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.177 Taking such extreme steps
as that bill proposed is either motivated by or capitalizing upon fear of
attack. Although fear is an inevitability, especially when American
citizens have experienced tragedies and are constantly reminded of them
by the media, imposing such harsh and broad consequences on those who
lawfully obtained U.S. citizenship—consequences imposed and strictly
enforced because of an ill-defined fear of attack—seems to overreach.
Further, courts have been known to acquiesce in the name of national
security in some of the seemingly wrongful actions, like internment, that
were instituted according to laws of the United States. It is therefore
important to notice and sound the alarm when a law is enacted from
motivations that do not sound in reason and justice, but rather motivations
that sound in fear of the unknown, of the different, of the “bogeyman.”
Such laws will not only likely fail to accomplish the objective of
monitoring terrorists and keeping true threats to national security off
American soil, but those laws will also serve to hurt this nation’s proud
history of taking in the “tired . . . poor, [and] huddled masses”178 and
consequently our standing in the world community.
Unlike Senator Cruz’s bill, some laws that have been enacted turn on
a finding of giving material support to a terrorist organization. These
provisions have become both a powerful tool in the national security arena
and in targeting “unwanted” aliens.
C. Material Support
Material support of a terrorist organization is a critical topic when
addressing the intersection between national security and immigration
law—specifically, in how fear drives American policing practices.
Material support of a terrorist organization is an act that prevents aliens
from adjusting their status to legal permanent resident or citizen and might
make an alien removable. Because the DHS defines material support very
broadly, much of the enforcement is left to subjective analysis.
“The United States now has a series of statutes that make it an offense
to provide material support to a terrorist activity or to an organization
176. Matt Welch, Citizenship-Stripping on the Rise Worldwide, REASON.COM
(Dec. 31, 2015), https://reason.com/blog/2015/12/31/citizenship-stripping-onthe-rise-worldw [https://perma.cc/X4ZN-YGKU].
177. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
178. THE NEW COLOSSUS, supra note 11.
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designated . . . as a terrorist organization.”179 For immigration purposes,
an organization may be deemed a terrorist organization in three different
ways. First, an organization may be designated by the Secretary of State
as a foreign terrorist organization (“FTO”) pursuant to section 219 of the
INA.180 Second, an organization may be designated as a terrorist
organization by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Attorney
General and the Secretary for Homeland Security.181 Third, an organization
may be designated as such if it is “a group of two or more individuals,
whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which
engages in, the activities described in [the INA]” 182—this was a catchall
provision added by the REAL ID Act.183 As a result, these groups are listed
on the State Department’s terrorist exclusion list (“TEL”) or identified as
immigration terrorist organizations (“ITOs”).184
The legal consequences differ if an organization is designated as a
terrorist organization under the FTO versus the TEL or ITO. Specifically,
a designation under the FTO subjects an alien to criminal penalties, bank
account freezes, and immigration sanctions which include detention and
removal.185 Designation under TEL or ITO, on the other hand, provides
only for immigration consequences.186
179. WAYNE MCCORMACK, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TERRORISM 115
(Matthey Bender & Company, Inc. 2007); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012).
180. 8 U.S.C. § 1189; id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).
181. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See id. §§ 2339A–2339B; see Rachel D. Settlage, Affirmatively Denied:
The Detrimental Effects of a Reduced Grant Rate of Affirmative Asylum Seekers, 27
B.U. INT’T L. J. 61, 89 n.155 (2009); see also Daniel C. LaPenta, Fighting Terrorism
Through the Immigration and Nationality Act: Dangers of Limiting the INA’s
Breadth Under Chema v. Ashcroft, 40 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 165, 193 (2005).
186. Both FTO and TEL-ITO support constitute per se or strict liability
offenses; any support provided to designated organizations after the designation
date will subject the alien to automatic immigration ramifications; no excuses will
be heard, except in rare circumstances under a waiver provision committed to the
Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney
General under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i). Otherwise, the government need not
prove that the alien was aware of the designation, that the organization is a terrorist
organization, or that the support provided would further the organization’s terrorist
activity. This latter point is important in situations in which the organization
conducts ostensibly charitable functions as well as its terrorist activities, and the
alien claims to have intended the support to benefit only the charitable functions.
An alien charged with materially supporting the undesignated third kind of group is
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Because of the broad definition of “material support” and because of
the varying penalties available depending upon which list an individual or
group is placed, the consequences are not likely to be uniform. Rather,
depending upon the enforcing officer or body and, most important to this
discussion, the political climate, an individual or group may suffer
consequences that bear little relation to the alleged threat. Because fear
drives popular mandates for far-reaching legislation to combat faceless
threats, the possibility that serious miscarriages of justice will occur is real.
D. Classified Information
The ATRC and the summary removal provision are important and
powerful immigration law mechanisms that allow the government to use
classified information in a removal proceeding without risk of that
information being released.187 Similar to how classified information is
protected in immigration proceedings, the government’s ability to protect
classified information in the immigration setting due to limited discovery
rules is important.
In the criminal setting, when the government brings a national security
or terrorism charge, the accused is entitled to the same constitutional
protections as would be available if the charge were theft. Relevant to the
discussion at hand, the accused is entitled to the right to trial by jury,188 to a
public trial,189 to confront witnesses and evidence,190 to not be “compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”191 and to due
process.192 Because immigration law is civil, however, none of the criminal
protections, except for the right to due process, attach to an alien in the
immigration setting.193 Even the right to due process is more limited in an
immigration action.194 However, there are times when the evidence that
not strictly liable and might avoid immigration sanctions if “he can demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not reasonably
have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization.” See 8 U.S.C. §§
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)–(VI). REAL ID Act section 103 increased the alien’s
burden in this respect. REAL ID Act section 104 enacted a new waiver provision
in INA section 212(d)(3).
187. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1537; id. § 1225(c).
188. U.S. CONST amend. VI.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. U.S. CONST amend. V.
192. Id.
193. See Bali, supra note 90, at 163.
194. In Jay v. Boyd, the Supreme Court has emphasized the breadth of the
Attorney General’s discretion in granting relief under the INA. 351 U.S. 345, 354
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could be used against an alien in a criminal case is so sensitive that its
release is more harmful to the nation’s security than not bringing the
criminal case at all. In these cases, the government may investigate to
determine if the alien has broken any immigration laws, which will likely
be the case if the alien is a national security threat, and may bring an
immigration case so that the criminal protections do not apply.195 Although
a successful immigration action does not place the dangerous alien in jail,
the alien may be detained and removed from the country.196
E. Detention
Detention law is at the forefront of the immigration and national
security crossroads. Section 236A of the INA “specifically provides for
the mandatory detention of suspected terrorists and sets forth requirements
of habeas corpus and judicial review.”197 In addition, the Supreme Court
has long held detention to be a necessary part of the deportation process in
national security cases.198 In the case of Zadvydas v. Davis, however, the
Supreme Court also held that in cases in which there is an order of removal,
(1956) (“Although such aliens have been given a right to a discretionary
determination on an application for suspension, a grant thereof is manifestly not
a matter of right under any circumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter of
grace.”); INS v. Yue Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. at 30 (reaffirming the Jay’s description
of the Attorney General’s discretion); Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 222 n.7 (1963)
(same). The Court has likened the discretion of the Attorney General with respect
to suspension of deportation to “a judge’s power to suspend the execution of a
sentence, or the President’s to pardon a convict.” Jay, 351 U.S. at 354 n.16
(quoting United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489, 491 (2d
Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.)); see also Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S.
272, 273 (1998) (expressly reaffirming Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
U.S. 458, 467 (1981), which held there is no liberty interest in a pardon).
195. If the government were to bring a removal action alleging that the alien
was in fact a national security concern, it may have to release some evidence in
its case in chief but not if the case was brought on a peripheral charge, for
example, marriage fraud, no such release would be necessary. In addition, because
there is not a liberty interest in the immigration context, the government would
not have to release classified information in discretionary relief that is sought by
the alien.
196. See supra Part III.D.
197. de Leon, supra note 9, at 125 (citing INA § 236A).
198. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (“Detention during
removal proceedings deportation proceedings is a constitutionally permissible
part of that process.”); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“Otherwise,
aliens arrested for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States
during the pendency of deportation proceedings.”).
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detention could not be indefinite while the government attempts to remove
the alien.199
As currently construed, the government may detain only admitted
aliens for a period reasonably necessary to remove them, presumptively
six months, absent evidence showing that deportation is likely to occur in
the reasonably foreseeable future, beyond the six-month threshold.200 This
six-month “limitation” poses significant problems for aliens who are
suspected or confirmed terrorists. The United States cannot simply let
them roam the streets, but the aliens’ home countries might not want them
on their streets either, thus making removal to these countries difficult and
requiring the process to extend past six months.
Zadvydas anticipated that certain aliens may pose this problem and
observed that in some cases, in which suspected terrorism or other “special
circumstances” exist, it may be possible to detain those individuals for
longer periods of time.201 Based on this language, DHS promulgated
regulations that authorize the continued detention of certain aliens not
deemed likely to be removed within the six-month timeframe.202 This
regulation has been challenged by habeas cases in two circuits to date.
Both cases held that the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agency (“ICE”) could not hold the aliens past the Zadvydas
period.203 These cases exhibit an ongoing conflict in the immigration field:
the executive branch’s duty through the INA to protect the country by
keeping the threat out and by detaining current threats and the court’s duty
199. 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (Here, resident aliens who had been ordered to be
removed and were held by the INS beyond the 90-day removal period because of
the government’s inability to remove them brought habeas petitions seeking
release. The Supreme Court held that the INA’s post-removal-period detention
provision contained an implicit reasonableness limitation, the federal habeas
statute granted federal courts the power to decide whether the detention was
authorized, and the presumptive limit to reasonable duration of post-removalperiod detention was six months.).
200. Id. at 698.
201. Id.
202. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 (2016). Aliens who pose serious foreign policy
consequences, aliens detained because of terrorism concerns, and aliens determined
to be especially dangerous by virtue of mental illness are considered to be potential
“special circumstances.” Id. §§ 241.14(b)–(f). To invoke a “special circumstances”
ground under the regulation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement must first
conduct a repatriation likelihood review under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13.
203. Tuan Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790, 798–99 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), as construed by Zadvydas, did not authorize potentially
indefinite detention pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241(f)); Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d
478, 484 (5th Cir. 2008).
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and right to grant remedies, in this case through a petition for habeas
corpus.
The PATRIOT Act reinforced the power to detain any person whom
the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe is a person
described in INA section 121(a)(3)(A)(i), that is, those suspected of
espionage, sabotage, or the like, or section 212(a)(3)(B), that is, one
suspected of terrorist activity.204 The aliens may be detained for seven days
before putting them in immigration proceedings or charging them
criminally.205 If the aliens are not charged, they shall be released.206 If
proceedings begin, however, the detention becomes mandatory even if the
individual is eligible for relief until either the Zadvydas time runs out or
the Attorney General has reason to believe that the individual is no longer
removable.207 Moreover, the Attorney General or his designated official
must review the alien’s detention certification every six months.208 If it is
unlikely that the detained individual will be removed or can be released in
the reasonably foreseeable future, under the Zadvydas doctrine, the
Attorney General can detain the individual for an additional six months
only if that person’s release will threaten national security or the safety of
the community.209 However, consider the hypothetical scenario where a
member of al Qaeda is captured in Yemen. After his final order of removal
is issued and his Zadvydas time runs out, which is a presumptive six
months, it is unlikely that the government will be in a position to return
the alien back to Yemen, as the CAT prevents the alien’s removal due to
the likelihood of torture. Because the release of this individual poses a
national security risk, the individual can be detained for an additional six
months, but must eventually be released.210
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued the Presidential Order
on Detention, which established the military procedures to detain and try
suspected terrorists who are not citizens of the United States.211 The Order

204. INA § 236A, 8 U.S.C. § 1226A (2012), PATRIOT Act § 412.
205. 8 U.S.C. § 1226A.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. The Attorney General may also detain suspected terrorist pursuant to
INA § 236(c)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(D), if they are inadmissible or
deportable for terrorist activities, and the Attorney General may also authorize
mandatory detention for individuals described in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4).
210. 8 U.S.C. § 1226A (a)(6).
211. See generally Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66
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gives the Secretary of Defense the authority to detain noncitizens who are
members of al Qaeda; who have engaged in, aided, or conspired to commit
acts of international terrorism; or who have harbored one or more such
individuals.212 A decade later, President Obama signed the National Defense
Authorization Act (“NDAA”) into law.213 President Obama signed the bill
into law after threatening to veto it because of its controversial language—
some have even compared provisions of the bill to the PATRIOT Act.214 He
voiced these concerns when he said that he signed the NDAA “chiefly
because it authorizes funding for the defense of the United States . . . . I have
signed this bill despite having serious reservations with certain provisions
that regulate the detention, interrogation, and prosecution of suspected
terrorists.”215 Even though President Obama voiced apprehension regarding
the bill, he still made the executive decision to enact it.
F. Holes in the Border
Criminals cannot migrate into the United States legally, so they come
illegally.216 In November 2015, a team of Los Zetas cartel gunmen crossed
the Texas border to escape Mexican authorities.217 Once they reached
Texas, they disappeared.218 To some degree, these criminals represent a
national security threat because they are hurting the quality of life of
thousands of Americans.219 When there are motives for individuals to
illegally enter the United States and the opportunity to do so, there is a
Fed. Reg. 57,833–36 (Nov. 16, 2001), reprinted in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1775 app.II (2001).
212. Id. at 57,834.
213. Adam Clark Estes, Obama Makes It Official: Suspected Terrorists Can Be
Indefinitely Detained Without a Trial, WIRE (Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.thewire
.com/politics/2011/12/obama-makes-it-official-suspected-terrorists-can-be-indefinite
ly-detained-without-trial/46818/ [https://perma.cc/CE34-YCYW].
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Mary De Ming Fan, The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and
Heuristic Mistake, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33, 40 (2007).
217. Cartel Chronicles, Exclusive: Los Zetas Cartel Gunmen Crossed into
Texas—Disappeared into U.S., BREITBART (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.breitbart
.com/texas/2015/11/16/exclusive-los-zetas-cartel-gunmen-crossed-texas-disappear
ed-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/9UNK-9BMD].
218. Id.
219. It is not argued that all crime should be treated as a national security issue;
rather crime should be treated as a national security issue only when the crime is
significant enough to alter the way of life for many Americans, such as crimes
related to illegal drugs.
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possible national security issue. Moreover, when those individuals do
cross the border, their crossing is not only a national security concern, but
also an immigration concern. For instance, from February through June
2007, the ICE California Gang Initiative in San Diego, San Francisco, and
Los Angeles targeted gang members who had illegally reentered the
United States after they had already been deported once or more.220 During
that initiative, ICE arrested 139 gang members and associates, 46 of whom
were prosecuted for criminal violations, beyond the immigration charge.221
ICE’s Criminal Alien Program (“CAP”) aims to identify allegedly
removable noncitizens who are incarcerated in jails and prisons and
initiate the removal proceedings.222 CAP is considered a “jail status check”
program, and it operates in federal, state, and local prisons and jails.223
In addition to “conventional” criminals slipping across the borders,
terrorists and other foreign agents also use the holes in the United States’s
borders.224 These individuals often use the same illegal infrastructure used
by those who traffic drugs and human beings into the United States.225
Indeed, evidence surfaced that al Qaeda had plans to infiltrate the United
States using the southern border: “Several al Qaeda leaders believe
operatives can pay their way into the country through Mexico and also
believe illegal entry is more advantageous than legal entry for operational
security reasons.”226 Intelligence agencies have warned local law
enforcement that al Qaeda terrorists were identified and seen with
members of the gang Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS-13.227
220. See U.S. IMMIGRATIONS & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT: PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY AND UPHOLDING PUBLIC SAFETY
(2007) [hereinafter ICE ANNUAL REPORT], http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo
/ICEFY2007AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QAF-G4KB].
221. Id.
222. The Criminal Alien Program (CAP): Immigration Enforcement in Prisons
and Jails, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org
/just-facts/criminal-alien-program-cap-immigration-enforcement-prisons-and-jails
[https://perma.cc/KT7V-7M7W].
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a
Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 337, 362 (2007).
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. Michele McPhee, Gang Tied To Terrorists, BOS. HERALD, Jan. 5, 2005, at
5. FBI Special Agent Robert B. Salle told the Washington Post, “MS-13 is the
strongest gang, the biggest gang. They are the strongest thing going on in terms of
organized gangs. MS-13's motto is kill, rape and control. . . . In terms of MS-13, the
estimates vary from 1,500 to 3,000 members in the D.C. region.” Del Quentin

2016]

THE EVER-CHANGING BOGEYMAN

279

During Operation Community Shield (“OCS”), ICE focused on the
national security threat that violent transnational gangs, such as MS-13,
pose.228 OCS established that most major cities in the United States are
experiencing an increase in gang activity.229 The major cities were not
alone, however; smaller communities throughout the United States are
experiencing an increase in gang activity as well.230 The OCS study
demonstrated that the ranks of these violent transnational gangs are largely
composed of foreign-born nationals and that MS-13 is “among the largest
and most violent of street gangs in the United States.”231 If gangs like MS13 are willing to traffic drugs or women and children as sex slaves—as
they do currently—then there is no reason to believe they would not help
smuggle in a terrorist, spy, or bomb. Further, there is evidence that ISIS
may be planning to infiltrate the U.S with the aid of transnational drug
cartels, a Department of Defense Analyst has said, citing MS-13 as the
most likely organization for such a partnership.232
Along with conventional national security and criminal laws, criminal
immigration statutes have been used to combat this threat. Two of the most
common criminal laws used by law enforcement are those prohibiting
illegal reentry233 and alien smuggling and harboring.234 To obtain a
conviction under § 1326, a prosecutor must show that a defendant: first, is
not a citizen of the United States; second, has been ordered to be removed
from the United States; third, has been physically removed from the
United States; forth, has reentered or attempted to reenter the United States
after the removal; and finally, did not have permission from the Attorney
General to reenter the United States.235 It might appear that this crime does
not have any overt national security implications. As mentioned, however,
whenever the border is breached, there is a national security implication.
Wilber, MS-13 Gang out to “Kill, Rape and Control”: FBI Agent, WASH. POST
(Jan. 11, 2010, 6:10 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/crime-scene/gangs
/ms-13-gang-out-to-kill-rape-an.html [https://perma.cc/UW97-ACJJ].
228. See ICE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 220. OCS was an assessment
whereby each ICE field office examined threat assessments to identify gangs and
associated criminal activity within its area of responsibility. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Andrew J. Ireland, New Border Risk: ISIS Ties to Mexican Drug Lords:
Expert Warns Middle East Turmoil Could Sting U.S., WND (July 4, 2014, 6:46
PM), http://www.wnd.com/2014/07/new-border-risk-isis-ties-to-mexican-druglords/ [https://perma.cc/T79S-RD7H].
233. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012).
234. Id. § 1324.
235. Id. § 1326.
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More important to the discussion at hand, charging an individual with
illegal reentry carries a heavy hammer with regard to sentencing. 236
Specifically, the statutory maximum for reentry after removal is two years,
unless the alien had three or more misdemeanor convictions.237 Then, the
sentence can be for up to ten years.238 If the alien’s deportation was subsequent
to conviction for an aggravated felony, which a crime implicating national
security would be, the maximum term of imprisonment is 20 years for merely
returning to the United States after being removed—a powerful weapon
against a particular type of alien.239
The national security implications of criminal alien smuggling and
harboring are more obvious—specifically, the potential that terrorists are
being smuggled across the border. Individuals are guilty of alien smuggling
and harboring if they knowingly bring or attempt to bring an alien into the
United States or recklessly disregard the “fact that an alien has come to,
entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, transports, or
moves or attempts to transport or move such alien within the United
States.”240 An individual is also guilty of alien smuggling and harboring if
in “reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or
remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or
shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from
detection, such alien”241 or “encourages or induces an alien to come to,
enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of
the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation
of law.”242 The typical punishment for alien smuggling and harboring is a
five-year maximum sentence, unless the act was done for the purpose of
financial gain, which carries a ten-year maximum sentence.243 If, however,
the individual who is smuggled commits an offense against the United
States, the maximum sentence is ten years.244 Moreover, in these cases
there is also a statutory mandatory minimum of three years.245
The current legal framework of immigration law provides a vast array
of tools for the U.S. government to use in its pursuit of national security
objectives. The availability of several remedies, including deportation,
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 1324.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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exclusion, detainment, and denaturalization, makes the implementation of
immigration law a powerful asset to the government. In fact, the use of the
civil immigration laws allows the government to circumvent procedural
safeguards that would apply in criminal proceedings against suspected
terrorists. Immigration laws and their use are critical in upholding national
security, as well as protecting the overall quality of life of American
citizens. The question remains, however, as to whether allowing fear to
drive immigration reform and law enforcement to further national security
interests is appropriate, considering the inherent and significant conflicts
with individual rights under the U.S. Constitution.
IV. LIBERTY CONCERNS WHEN USING IMMIGRATION LAW
AS A TOOL OF NATIONAL SECURITY
The notion of the “rule of law” plays a key role in the immigration and
national security debate. In ancient Greece, the phrase referred primarily
to the concept that the government is subordinate to the law.246 Thus, many
argue that the rule of law in the immigration context should focus on the
ends that the system should serve: upholding the larger goal of human and
civil rights.247 On the other end of the spectrum, rule of law means a strict
observance to “law and order,” which requires the government to adhere
to standing laws.248
Both pro- and anti-immigration advocates use the rule of law as
support for their positions.249 Restrictionists see the rule-of-law argument
as the key to answering a chaotic and ballooning alien population.250 These
advocates maintain that lackadaisical enforcement traduces the rule of law,
246. Donald Kerwin & Margaret D. Stock, The Role of Immigration in a
Coordinated National Security Policy, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383, 425 (2007)
(“These can include: (1) government adherence to standing laws (with judicial
review); (2) ‘law and order’ in the sense of protection of the lives, rights and
property of residents; (3) equality before the law; (4) human rights; and (5)
efficient and predictable justice.”).
247. See id. at 425–26.
248. Id.
For example, a legal system might exemplify the rule of law if its rules
were: (1) prospective and possible to comply with; (2) promulgated,
clear, and coherent; (3) stable enough to allow persons to be guided by
knowledge of their content; (4) the basis of decrees and orders governing
specific situations; (5) binding on those with the authority to make,
administer and apply rules; and (6) administered consistently.
Id.
249. Id. at 426.
250. Id.
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making it less powerful.251 Discounting the traditional Greek sense of rule
of law as a subordinate government, restrictionists instead focus on a
single goal of the legal system: policing.252 However, “[i]mmigrant
advocates focus on how the U.S. immigration system violates human
rights and does not serve appropriate ‘ends’ such as predictable justice or
equality under the law.” 253
This argument regarding the rule of law is often phrased as a debate
over security versus civil liberties and human rights.254 There is no doubt
that immigration policy and national security are linked.255 Most of the
September 11th hijackers were in the U.S. because of breaches in the
immigration armor.256 It therefore makes sense that if an essential aspect
of national security is to prevent further attacks, then to ignore the
immigration aspect in this argument is to leave an “unprotected spot in the
Nation’s armor.”257
Many have argued, however, that using immigration policy to combat
terrorism and other national security threats is an abuse of power because
it treats aliens first as terrorist suspects “and it sends a hostile,
unwelcoming message to the world.”258 In addition, those who oppose the
use of immigration law as a national security weapon cite the fact that in
doing so, the United States draws lines between U.S. citizens and
noncitizens, which erodes the constitutional protections and civil liberties
that have been endowed to noncitizens over the past two centuries.259 What
these opponents seem to overlook is the enumerated power over
immigration that the Constitution provides to the federal government. It is
well established that Congress has plenary power over immigration.260 In
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. “A growing body of legal reform reports, for example, has decried the
retroactive application of certain immigration laws, the lack of clarity in legal
standards and decision-making, the inconsistent application of immigration law,
and the lack of coherence between immigration and other laws.” Id. In this regard
the rule of law is undermined by the “closed deportation hearings, a summary
appeals process, restrictions on judicial review, and the absence of governmentappointed counsel.” Id.
254. See id. at 426–27.
255. de Leon, supra note 9, at 115.
256. See generally id. at 116.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such
Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to permit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and

2016]

THE EVER-CHANGING BOGEYMAN

283

addition, the President is charged with the power and duty under Article II
to enforce the Constitution, which would include the laws Congress enacted
concerning immigration.261
The flaw in the arguments for both those who believe that immigration
law is merely an arrow in the national security quiver and those who argue
that using such an arrow is a breach of civil liberties is that both parties seem
to argue that these concepts are mutually exclusive.262 Specifically, “the
debate has been miscast as one that requires a trade-off between security and
rights.”263 Nonetheless, “a human rights framework can embrace both
individual rights and the ends they serve, including safety, liberty, and the
common good. The quality of the immigration debate depends on a more
nuanced view of security and human rights.”264
One commentator on this subject noted that discourse on this issue
tends to be proffered in “absolute language, in individual terms, and
without reference to their ends or to corresponding duties.”265 Thus, the
debate over just what constitutes the parameters of an individual alien’s
rights has become more vociferous and uncompromising, and at the same
time, the number of claimed civil liberties in the immigration context has
expanded.266 Moreover, there now appears to be a sense that if advocates
can describe their desired outcome as a “right,” it will magically resolve
the underlying issue.267 Yet “‘[r]ights’—so formulated—may express
desirable social outcomes, but they often have little relevance to the
‘common good’ or to other ends.”268 For example, an individual fleeing
persecution because of race, religion, or political affiliation is historically
considered to have the right to do so.269 However, if as a result, the United
States current immigration policy allows dangerous individuals to enter its
borders, that policy risks infringing on other Americans’ rights to be free
from dangerous individuals.
eight.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress “[t]o establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 17 (1824)
(establishing the plenary power doctrine, under which the federal government’s
power over immigration may be exercised at its complete and utmost extent
without limitations, save for those limitations prescribed in the Constitution).
261. U.S. CONST. art. II.
262. Kerwin & Stock, supra note 246, at 427.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 12, 14 (1991)).
266. Id.
267. Id. (citing BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS 346–47 (1997)).
268. Id.
269. Id.
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No doubt that many Americans view the immigration apparatus as an
ineffective tool against terrorism or other threats.270 “On the other hand,
many immigration advocates believe that [U.S.] immigration laws offend
the right to family reunification, the right to make a living, and the right to
just working conditions.”271 Still others, especially Americans who live by
the border, view illegal immigration as an infringement on their rights to
pursue happiness, security, and property.272 Those in the business sector
see immigration restrictions as a violation of their ability to hire immigrant
workers and move the prosperity of their companies forward.273 “Some
U.S. workers see their rights to a just wage and appropriate working
conditions undermined by immigrants. In many ways, these competing
sides talk past each other, a problem exacerbated by the way the
proponents use “rights language.”274
The Constitution echoes this aim of balance between rights and
security, specifically to “form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty.”275 Thomas
Jefferson understood that the concept of common defense did not have to
conflict with individual rights, stating that “[a] strict observance of the
written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is
not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our
country when in danger, are of higher obligation.”276 Jefferson went on to
say that to “lose [the] country by a scrupulous adherence to written law,
would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who
are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the
means.”277
Thomas Jefferson’s view of this problem focuses on the practicality
necessary to effectively maintain our rights and security. When framed in
a contemporary context, the absolute need for that practicality is evident.
This practicality is captured in a monologue delivered on a television
show, The Wire, in which a police captain tells his officers about the need
to evaluate each threat for its severity before acting to have resources left
to achieve the police department’s larger goals effectively:
270. Id. at 427.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 427–48.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. U.S. CONST. pmbl; see also Kerwin & Stock, supra note 246, at 428.
276. Kerwin & Stock, supra note 246, at 428 (citing Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810)).
277. Id.
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Somewheres, back in the dawn of time, this District had itself a
civic dilemma—of epic proportion. The City Council had just
passed a law that forbid alcoholic consumption in public places, on
the streets, and on the corners. But the corner is, and it was, and it
always will be the poor man’s lounge. It’s where a man wants to be
on a hot summer’s night. It’s cheaper than a bar, catch a nice breeze,
and watch the girls go by. But the law is the law. The Western cops
rolling by, what were they going to do? If they arrested every dude
out there for tipping back a High Life, there’d be no other time for
any kind of police work. And if they looked the other way, they’d
open themselves to all kinds of flaunting, all kinds of disrespect.
Now, this was before my time when it happened, but somewhere
back in the 50s or 60s, there was a small moment of god-damn
genius by some nameless smokehound who comes out the cut-rate
one day and, on his way to the corner, he slips that just-bought pint
of elderberry into a paper bag. A great moment of civic
compromise. That small, wrinkled-ass paper bag allowed the corner
boys to have their drink in peace, and it gave us permission to go
and do police work—the kind of police work that’s actually worth
the effort, that's worth actually taking a bullet for.278
In the immigration context, a “strict observance of the written laws”279
is important, but it is not so important that other concerns should not also
be weighed. Just as the police in that scene from The Wire had to focus on
dealing with those “cornerboys” who openly flaunted the breaking of a
rather unimportant law, a strict adherence to our immigration laws—most
often in reaction to events rather than with a cool heart and steady pen—
will lead to our finite law enforcement and intelligence resources being
diverted toward otherwise rather unimportant causes. The United States
has shone as a beacon for much of its history, but if the United States
forgets its own history as a nation of immigrants, a nation that has always
been a place where the persecuted could find shelter, it will find itself a
lesser nation as a result. However, the Constitution itself would cease to
be worth the paper on which it is written if the U.S. cannot maintain
security. Indeed, just as the American way of life can be destroyed by
gradually forgetting who we are and what we stand for, it can also be
obliterated by the shockwave and fallout from a mushroom cloud.
Accordingly, when considering the threshold question of whether it is
appropriate to use immigration law and policy as a national security tool,
278. The Wire: All Due Respect (HBO television broadcast Sept. 27, 2004).
279. Kerwin & Stock, supra note 246, at 428.
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the answer is absolutely. However, that power must be tempered and used
with wisdom and balance. Otherwise, too much is forfeited.
CONCLUSION
Throughout this nation’s history, fear has driven the development of
immigration laws. Today, candidates for the American presidency trumpet
that same fear as a means to stir opinions and encourage voting. National
security, however, is a broader issue than the events displayed on the six
o’clock news—it is more than just terrorism and a nuclear Korean
Peninsula.
America is a land of immigrants and the ability to maintain the reality
that immigration has achieved—a whole that is greater than the sum of its
parts—is a vital part of our national security interest. Not only does a
rational immigration policy bring the best and brightest to the United
States—such as Albert Einstein— it also brings a diversity of culture that
has proven to be our greatest diplomatic instrument.
Conversely, an immigration policy that is not rational can lead to
borders that are too open, allowing this country’s enemies access to its
streets. September 11, 2001 brought this reality into focus. As a result, the
federal government has enacted new immigration laws, in addition to
using current laws pointedly, as tools of national security. Far from a new
development, the creation of new immigration laws was merely the latest
reaction to an event that revealed the holes in the nations’ armor and shook
the nation to its core. That reaction was one based in fear.
Because of the unique nature of immigration law, the lines of liberty
and security have been hard to define and balance. Because maintaining
integrity at the borders and continuing our great experiment as a nation of
immigrants are both national interests, this conflict will most likely always
exist. It is the balance of those interests that will ultimately define us, and
we must work to ensure that this Great Experiment continues on terms we
coolly and logically set down. Fear is instinctual: it protects us, but it also
prompts irrational reactions. The great power of human beings, however,
is that we may reason beyond mere instinct—this above all else, must be
remembered. If the United States is to remain the “shining city upon the
hill,” it cannot be a faux façade. While her gates cannot be open to all, they
must be open.

